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Abstract
Micro-finance  supports mainly informal  activities that  Khandker addresses  these questions using household
often have low market demand. It may  be thus  level panel  data from Bangladesh.  The findings confirm
hypothesized that the aggregate poverty impact of micro-  that micro-finance  benefits the poorest and has sustained
finance  in an  economy with low economic  growth is  impact in reducing poverty  among program participants.
modest or nonexistent.  The observed  borrower-level  It also has positive spillover impact,  reducing poverty at
poverty impact  is then  a result of income  redistribution  the village level.  But the effect  is more pronounced  in
or short-run income generation.  reducing extreme  rather than moderate  poverty.
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9810,  email  address  dafzal@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://
econ.worldbank.org.  The author may  be contacted  at skhandker@worldbank.org.  January  2003.  (31  pages)
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I.  Introduction
The  objective  of this  paper  is to  estimate  the  long-run  impacts  of micro-finance  on household
consumption  and poverty in Bangladesh,  based on household survey data collected in  1991/92 and
1998/99.  Since  its advent in early  1980s micro-finance  has been the focus of many development
issues. Bangladesh  is the  pioneer  of the  micro-finance  movement  and  the  home  of the  largest
micro-finance  operation  in the  world..  Development  practitioners  have  been  keen  to  know  the
extent of poverty reduction  possible with micro-finance  operation  that mostly supports the poor.
Micro-finance  means small-scale  transactions of credit and savings. As such, it is largely meant to
meet  the  needs  of small-  and  medium-scale  producers  and  businesses.  The  poor,  especially
women,  are  the target  of micro-finance  organizations  in many countries,  including  Bangladesh.
Besides  financial  services,  micro-finance  sometimes  offers  skill-based  training  to  augment
productivity or organizational  support and consciousness-raising  training to empower the poor.
How  much  poverty  reduction  is possible  with micro-finance?  Benefiting  from  a micro-
finance  program,  unlike  other  transfer  schemes,  requires  not  only  an  individual's  own
entrepreneurship  but  also  a  favorable  local  market.  Even  if the  marginal  gains  from  micro-
borrowing accrued  to participants  may be large, the  accrued total benefits from micro-finance  in
reducing  poverty  are  likely  to  be  small,  as  micro-finance  transactions  are  often  too  small  in
volume to have  a sustained aggregate  impact on poverty reduction.  In an economy where there is
not much growth, borrowing by the poor can improve income redistribution.  Thus, it is of policy
interest to know whether accrued benefits at the borrower level are due to sustained income impact
or simple  income  redistribution.  This  involves  an assessment  of long-term poverty  impacts  of
micro-finance.This  paper uses household  panel  data from Bangladesh  to  address  three issues.  First,  it
will determine whether the poor who lack both physical (such as land) and human capital (such as
education)  actually participate  more in micro-finance programs.  Second, the paper will assess the
long-term  impacts  of micro-finance  on poverty.  Third,  it will  assess  the  aggregate  impact  of
micro-finance  to determine if the program is helping the poor beyond program participation.
The paper  is organized  as  follows.  Section two  reviews  current  literature  on the micro-
finance  programs  in Bangladesh.  Section  three  outlines  the research  framework,  while  section
four discusses the data to be used in the impact analysis of micro-finance  programs.  Section five
presents  estimates  of who  participates  in  micro-finance  programs  in  Bangladesh.  Section  six
reports the impact  estimates  at the borrower  level.  Section seven discusses the  spillover impacts
of micro-finance.  Finally, the results are summarized  in the concluding section.
II.  What we  already know about micro-finance  in Bangladesh
Unlike their formal counterpart, micro-finance  organizations  in Bangladesh have made their stride
in delivering  financial services  (both savings and credit)  to the poor, especially women,  at a very
low loan  default cost.  Strategies such as collateral-free  group-based  lending and mobilization  of
savings, even in small amounts, have helped them mitigate the problems of poor outreach and high
loan  default  costs  of their  formal  counterpart.  However,  they  assume  high transaction  costs  in
order  to  keep  credit  discipline  among  borrowers  through  group  pressure  and  monitoring  of
borrowers'  behavior.  The  transaction  cost  is  substantial  and  programs  have  been  relying  on
donors  for  sustaining  their  operations  (e.g.,  Khandker  1998;  Khalily,  Imam,  and  Khan,  2000;
Morduch  1999; Yaron 1994).  Nonetheless, the government  and donors continue to support micro-
finance programs in Bangladesh with the expectation that society benefits from such investment.
Micro-finance  programs  support  the production  and  consumption  of the poor.  Loans  in
easy repayment  terms help  smooth consumption  and  create jobs for the unemployed.  Resources
from  donors  have  alternative  uses  such as  building community  infrastructure,  school  or health
facilities.  Thus,  there  are  many ways by which  the poor can benefit  from  the resources  used  in
micro-finance programs.  For government  and donors,  the issue is clear: if it is evident that micro-
2finance programs  do not benefit the  poor in  a sustainable  way, then  the resources  channeled  to
micro-finance  are misplaced.
Therefore,  policymakers  and  program  organizers  are  keen  to  learn  the  extent  of
socioeconomic  impacts of micro-finance  on borrowers  and on society at  large.  At the household
level,  two  types  of impacts  can  be  carried  out-household  and  individual  impacts  of  micro-
finance.  Household  level  impacts  such  as  impacts  on  income,  employment,  and  poverty  are
assessments  without  specifying  the  intra-household  distribution  of induced  benefits  of micro-
finance.  Intra-household  impacts  are  examined  to  learn  the  distribution  of benefits  among
different  members  of  households,  especially  between  men  and  women.  Since  women  are
disadvantaged  in a society  such as Bangladesh  and constitute  the overwhelming  share of micro-
finance membership,  the policy question is: do women benefit from micro-finance  and if so, how?
At  the  societal  level,  the  policy  question  is:  do  micro-finance  programs  benefit  non-program
participants or do they simply help redistribute income in a society?
While the financial review of micro-finance  programs in Bangladesh is not as promising as
one would expect,  the  literature  on the impact  assessment  of socioeconomic  benefits  of micro-
finance  programs  shows  micro-finance  as  a  promising  instrument  for  poverty  reduction.
Findings,  of course,  differ  from  one  study  to  another  because  of the  differences  in  impact
assessment  methodologies  used;  however,  these  studies  are  in  agreement  that  micro-finance
programs  help  the  poor,  although  all  participants  may not  benefit  equally.  One  of the  early
studies  of Grameen  Bank  shows  how  Grameen  Bank  has  been  supporting  the poor,  especially
women, in terms of employment,  income  generation  and promotion of social indicators  (Hossain
1988).  Other  BIDS  (Bangladesh  Institute  of Development  Studies)  and non-BIDS  studies  also
indicate  the  beneficial  aspects  of micro-finance  operation  in  Bangladesh  (e.g.,  Rahman  1996;
Hashemi,  Schuler, and Riley  1996;  Schuler and Hashemi  1994). These studies show the positive
correlation  between  micro-finance  programs  and  their  accrued  benefits,  but do  not  indicate  the
causality,  meaning  whether  these  programs  actually  matter  in  generating  such  benefits  to  the
borrowers.
3The most comprehensive  and rigorous micro-finance impacts  studies that have established
causality were carried out in a joint research by BIDS and the World Bank  (Khandker  1998; Pitt
and Khandker  1998). This body of research provides a strong indication that the programs help the
poor in consumption  smoothing  as well as in building assets. The findings also lend support to the
claim that micro-finance  programs promote investment in human capital  (such as  schooling)  and
contribute  to  increasing  awareness  to  reproductive  health  (such  as the  use  of contraceptives)
among poor families.  This major study also sheds lights on the role of gender-based  targeting and
its impact on household or individual  welfare.  Findings suggest that women do acquire assets of
their own and exercise power in household decision-making.'
The positive  impacts  of micro-finance  programs  at  the  borrower  level  are  thus  tenable.
Even then,  the question  arises: what  are the long-run impacts  of micro-finance?  Are the program
impacts  found  in  1991/92  sustainable  over  time?  If poverty reduction  is possible  with  micro-
finance at the borrower level, what  is the impact of micro-finance  on aggregate poverty?  Earlier
estimates  suggest that micro-finance  can contribute to consumption  at a rate of 18 percent in the
case of female borrowing  and at  11  percent  in the case of male borrowing.  Of course,  this is  a
short-term  impact and,  hence,  may be short-lived.  It is possible that the proportion of program
participants  enjoying  the  benefits  of micro-finance  is  very small  and that the  impacts  of their
accrued benefits on the overall economy are small as well and may not be sustainable over time.
The  World Bank study based  on the  1991/92 household  survey indicates  that only about
less than 5 percent of borrowers can lift themselves  out of poverty each year by borrowing from  a
micro-finance  program  even  if the  estimated  impacts  on consumption  are  sustained  over time
(Khandker  1998).  Such percentage  represents  only about  1 percent  of the population;  thus,  the
aggregate poverty  impact of micro-finance  program  is quite negligible.  Does it imply that micro-
finance programs do not need to be supported?
l Morduch (1998), using the same BIDS-World Bank survey data but a different technique  (difference-in-difference
method), finds that program effects are either non-existent or very small.  He argues that the Pitt and Khandker (1998)
estimates of program impacts are over-estimated and, thus, the flagship programs such as the Grameen Bank do not
really help the poor. Pitt (1999) re-examined  Morduch's (1999) approach and concluded that Morduch applied a
wrong method to the BIDS-World Bank data set, which in fact underestimated the program impacts. Pitt's re-
estimation re-confirns that the impacts of Grameen Bank and other programs  as shown in the Pitt and Khandker
(1998) study are indeed well founded. For those who are interested in Pitt's analysis of Morduch's re-analysis of Pitt
and Khandker (1998),  go to http://pstc3.pstc.brown.edu/rnmp/
4Despite this miniscule  aggregate  impact,  the micro-finance movement  in Bangladesh  has
received continuous  support  from donors,  and more recently  from the  World Bank. In  1996,  the
World Bank provided  a  loan of US$115  million  to the country's  autonomous  body called Palli
Karma Shahayak  Foundation (PKSF). This body works as an internediary for wholesaling micro-
finance.  It  supports  the  on-lending  of small  non-government  organizations  (NGOs)  and a  few
large  NGOs  such  as  the  Bangladesh  Rural  Advancement  Committee  (BRAC).  However,  the
Grameen  Bank did not seek any loan or grant  from this  facility.  The project ended in June 2000
and the World Bank, with the request from the government, supported a follow-up  project of US$
160 million.  With the flow of funds  from various  micro-finance  agencies  to borrowers,  about 8
million (out of a total of approximately  30 million) households  received help from micro-finance
programs in 1998/99.2  Loan outstanding of micro-finance  programs was about US$600 million in
1998/99.  The organized NGO  sector and the specialized Grameen  Bank accounted  for more than
86 percent of micro-finance  lending, while  only  14 percent  came from the country's commercial
banks.3
Despite the large  inflow of micro-credit into the rural  sector of Bangladesh, the incidence
of rural poverty has been stubbornly high.  Rural poverty was 54 percent in 1983/84 and has been
above  50  percent  over the  last decade  (Ravallion  and  Sen  1995).  It  has  declined  to  about  45
percent  in recent  years;  yet the  incidence  of poverty  has  remained  high.  Critics  argue  that  this
reflects  the  limitation  of micro-finance  programs  as  an  instrument  in  arresting  poverty  in  a
country,  which  has  the  largest  micro-finance  operation  in  the  world.  Is  the high  incidence  of
poverty a result of the failure of micro-finance  movement?  Or is it an outcome of the persistently
low economic growth rate (which has been only 4 percent over the last decade) in the country?  If
substantial poverty reduction largely depends on sustained high economic growth, what is the net
overall contribution of the micro-finance  movement in Bangladesh?
2  This means about a quarter of rural households  were direct beneficiaries of microfinance  in Bangladesh in 1998/99.
3 There is a common misconception among many people that Grameen Bank is an NGO.  On the contrary,  it is a
specialized bank with its own charter approved by the government of Bangladesh.
5III.  Impact assessment  using panel data
The  sources  of  bias  in  any  program  impact  assessment  are  the  non-randomness  of program
placement and program participation.  In many cases, antipoverty programs, such as the Grameen
Bank,  are placed  in areas  with high incidence  of poverty.  Thus,  by comparing  the incidence  of
poverty in program and non-program  areas, researchers may mistakenly conclude that micro-credit
programs have increased  poverty.  Similarly, those who participate  actually may self-select into a
program based on unobserved traits such as entrepreneurial  ability. Thus, by comparing behavioral
outcomes,  such  as per capita consumption  of food and non-food,  between  participants  and  non-
participants,  evaluators  may mistakenly  conclude that the program  has  a high impact on poverty
even if part of the effects is due to the unobserved  ability of the participants  and has nothing to do
with the program.  In other words,  it  is possible  that the estimated  program  effects  may well  be
under- or overestimated depending on the circumstances.
A  careful  study clearly  shows  that  endogeneity  of both micro-credit  program  placement
and  program  participation  is  a  serious  issue  and  the  findings  could  be  misleading  if the
endogeneity  is not taken  into account  in the  estimation  (Pitt and  Khandker  1998).  The method
used  by  Pitt and  Khandker  (1998)  is  based  on  cross-section  data  but  they  employed  a  quasi-
experimental  survey  design to resolve  the problems of endogeneity  associated with non-random
program placement and self-selected program participation.
Three components  of the quasi-experimental  survey design are: (a) households  are sampled
in  villages  that  are  with  and  without  programs;  (b)  both eligible  and ineligible  households  are
sampled in both types of villages; and (c) program participants and non-participants within eligible
households  are sampled.  The two central underlying conditions  for program impact identification
are:  (i) exogenous landholding  and (ii)  gender-based program  design.  Since only the households
with landholding of less than half of an acre are eligible, this helps to identify the program  impact
on participants  by distinguishing  who participates and  who does not even if both are  eligible to
join a micro-credit program.  However,  program  effects are conditioned  by why certain villages
are treated with a program by drawing randomly both program  villages and non-program villages.
The villages  are further  identified  by women-only  and  men-only  groups,  which  in  turn  helped
identify program impacts by gender of program participants.
6The quasi-experimental  survey  design  is  one  of many methods  evaluators  use  to  assess
program effects.  There are three compelling  reasons  for an impact analysis using a panel  survey
over a  cross-sectional  survey:  (i)  Cross-section  results may not be  robust  as  some studies  show
that measurement  of program  impacts depends importantly on the methods used to treat program
endogeneity  (e.g.,  Lalonde  1986).  (ii)  It is important to  see  the robustness  of the  results with  a
method other than the one used in Pitt and Khandker (1998).  With panel data, the household-level
fixed-effects  method is less reliant on the exact application of the landholding  rule by the micro-
credit programs.  (iii)  Cross-section  data provide  short-term  program  effects;  however,  program
takes  a long time to influence  outcomes  such as  assets or human  capital  investment  in children.
Panel  data analysis  will  help measure  the program  effects  on long-term  household  or individual
welfare  .
To show how the panel data can be used to estimate program effects, assume the following
reduced-form borrowing by women  (Bwf) and men (B.m) of i-th households inj-th village in period
t:
Bj  =XU,/3bf  + 77'  +  ?  Sy  +b  y  i  (1)
Bymt  =  X  jit6bm+  +  7+ 
4jm + _gmt  (2)
where Xis a vector of household characteristics  (e.g.,  age and education of household  head), ,1 is a
vector of unknown  parameters  to  be  estimated,  a  is  an  unmeasured  determinant  of the  credit
demand that is time-invariant and fixed within a household, ,  is an unmeasured determinant  of the
credit demand that is time-invariant  and fixed within a village, and e is a non-systematic  error.
The conditional  demand  for consumption  (Co,)  in each  period  conditional  on the level  of
borrowing by male (By,,,t)  and that by female  (Bzpfl)  for each period, is given as4
4The justification for including borrowing  into the dynamic  consumption equation such as (3) can be done by
modifying the Ramsey consumption growth model by allowing marginal product of capital to depend on the level of
borrowing  in the presence of constraints  on capital mobility, making households credit constrained (a similar
argument on geographical capital imrnobility has been mentioned as a factor in consumption growth in Jalan and
Ravallion 2002).  Assuming that households are  credit constrained, the marginal product of capital depends on
borrowing (B), given by r(B).  An optimization of consumption over time subject to production constraints  can lead to
7C,,, = Xyfl.C  + Bwr + BUm,A  +  7u' +,U'  + Ct  (3)
where 4 and &  are the effects of female and male credit, respectively.
The impact  of credit  on household  outcomes  such  as consumption  can  be measured  by
estimating  equation  (3).  However,  the  credit  demand  by  either  male  or  female  as  given  in
equations  (1)  and  (2)  needs to be  estimated jointly with equation  (3).  Using cross-section  data
(t11)  raises  endogeneity  of equation  (3)  on  equations  (1)  and  (2)  as  a  result  of the  possible
correlation  among  errors  between  borrowing  equations  and  errors  among  borrowing  and
consumption  equations  (Pitt and Khandker  1998).  However,  equation  (3)  includes no variables
that are not included in equations  (1) and  (2) or vice versa.  That means,  the estimating equation
(3) is not distinguishable  from equations (1)  and (2).
Pitt  and  Khandker  (1998)  used  a  village-level  fixed-effect  method  to  resolve  program
placement  (or village-level)  endogeneity of the  1991/92 data.  But they could not use fixed-effect
method  at the household  level  to resolve  endogeneity  of household participation  because of the
non-availability  of a  household  panel  (t11).  So  they  adopted  a two-stage  instrumental  variable
(IV) method to resolve the endogeneity of a household's participation.  In the IV method, they used
exogenous  gender-  and  landholding-based  exclusion  restrictions  to  create  discontinuous
household's  program  choice  variable.  That  variable was  interacted  with household's  observable
characteristics  to create instruments.
With panel  data where households  have more than one observation  (1>1),  such  two-stage
identification restrictions  are not required. This is simply done by differencing  out the unobserved
village and household  attributes,  which are the sources of correlation  between the credit  demand
and household  outcome  equations.  Differencing  equation  (3)  at  two  points of time yields  the
following outcome equation
an optimal rate of consumption growth C(t) as a function of the rate of return to capital (which is constrained by
borrowing),  rate of depreciation,  and subjective  rate of time reference.  Assume that the error terms include these
subjective rate of time preference and rate of depreciation.
8JCy = AXjfi,  +  LBi5f + LBjm5m  + Jec  (4)
Consistent estimates of the credit effect  5f  and f;m can be obtained from equation (4) using
household  fixed-effects method.  This is based on the assumption that the error terms of the credit
demand  and outcome equations  are uncorrelated,  that is, Corr(Ae',b,  JecIU) = 0. However, the error
terms  may  be  correlated  for  reasons  other  than  the  endogeneity  of program  placement  and
participation.  For example,  unobserved  socio-economic  factors  which  are assumed  fixed at  the
household  level may  change over time. Under  such  circumstances,  equations  (1) and  (2) can  be
rewritten after incorporating the variation of  i1  and u over time as,
B,jf  =  XWj48bf  +  P  b  +  (1')
BgjmX  =  Xjbm  +  I7 imt  +  Jb.ml  +  6biumt  (2')
Since  household-level  fixed-effects  method  resolves  any village-level  endogeneity  too,  we  can
omit for simplicity village-level unmeasured  determinants of credit (u) from above two equations.
Substituting  these  values  of  Biffp  and  Bijmt  and  excluding  the  p  terms  in  equation  (3)  and
differencing it at two points, equation (4) can be rewritten as,
ACy  = AXjy,c  + JB6f 1 +  ABijm.m  +41y +  +Ac'  (4')
Thus,  we see  that even  household-level  panel data may not yield unbiased estimates  of program
impacts.  One possible  solution  to  this  problem  is  to  introduce  two-stage  instrumental  variable
method along with the household-level  fixed-effect method.  This is adopted in this paper.
IV.  The data and their characteristics
The BIDS and the World Bank together surveyed  1,769 households  drawn from 87 villages in 29
thanas in  1991/92.  Eight program  thanas  were  drawn randomly  from  each of BRAC,  Grameen
Bank,  and BRDB's RD-12 project  areas; 5 non-program  thanas were also  drawn randomly.  Three
villages were drawn  randomly from each thana,  where  the programs had been in operation  for at
least  three  years.  The  survey  was  conducted  three  times  during  1991/92,  based  on  the  three
cropping  seasons:  round  1 during  Aman  rice  (November-February),  round  2  during  Boro rice
9(March-June),  and  round  3 during  Aus  rice  (July-October).  However,  because  of attrition,  only
1,769 households were available in the third round.
Out of 1,769 households  surveyed in  1991/92 by program  participation  status, 8.5  percent
were  Grameen  Bank  members,  11.6  percent  were  BRAC  members,  6.2  percent  were  RD-12
project  members,  40.3  percent  were  eligible  non-participants,  and  33.1  percent  were non-target
households  (Table  1).  A  follow-up  survey of the  same households was done in  1998/99.  During
the re-survey, new households  from the old villages and new villages in old thanas, and from three
new thanas were included, thereby augmenting the sample households  to 2,599.5 According to the
re-survey,  14.3  percent households  were  Grameen Bank  members;  9.3 percent  BRAC members;
3.6  percent  RD-12  project  members;  11.1  percent  other  NGO  members;  7.4  percent  multiple
program members; 25.6 percent  eligible non-participants;  and 28.8 percent non-target households.
Comparing  the  two  surveys,  the  extent  of program  participation  among  rural  households  has
increased from 26.3 percent in 1991/92 to 45.6 percent in 1998/99.
If participation  is restricted to eligible households, the extent of program participation
increased to 64.2 percent in 1998/99 from 39.5 percent in 1991/92.  The annual dropout rate,
which was about 5.5 percent in 1991/92, increased to about 29.3 percent in 1998/99.  Net program
participation among the eligible households,  after adjusting for the dropouts, was 37.1  percent in
1991/92 and 45.3 percent in 1998/99. Even after adjustments due to attrition,  the program
participation has increased over the years.  This suggests that programs must have benefited
participants;  otherwise, the extent of program participation among the eligible households  would
not have increased.
Program participation  among landless and land-poor households is higher than that among
landed households.  For example, the  participation rate is 56 percent in 1991/92 and 59 percent in
1998/99 among the landless households (Table 2).  Among those who hold land up to 50 decimals
(first three groups in the table), the participation rate increased  from 33.9 percent in 1991/92 to
5  Among the 1,769 households surveyed in 1991/92 survey,  131  could not be re-traced  in 1998/99 because  of
attrition, leaving  1,638 households available for the re-survey. However because of household split-offs,  237 original
households split to form 546 households  in 1998/99,  resulting in 1,947 household counts from original survey.  Added
to them were 652 new households from 1998/99 survey, making total households to 2,599.  Khandker and Pitt (2002),
in a separate paper, addressed the issue of bias due to attrition and split-offs in the same survey.
1056.1 percent in 1998/99.  Not all households among program participants,  however,  strictly meet
the land-based eligibility criteria of micro-finance programs.  The extent of potential mistargeting
has not changed much since 1991/92.  About 23 percent of program borrowers came from non-
target households  (those having 50+ decimals of land) in 1991/92 compared to 25 percent in
1998/99 (Table 2).  Among the participants, the ultra poor (households owning less than or equal
to 20 decimals of land) constitute about 33 percent in the 1991/92  survey and 58 percent in the
1998/99 survey.6
The extent of multiple membership  is a new phenomenon  that  surfaced  in the  re-survey.
Cases  of households  being  members  of more  than  one  program  at  the  same  time  have  been
reported  in the  1998/99  survey but not in the 1991/92  survey.  As shown in Table 2, the extent of
multiple  program  membership  was  16  percent.  Multiple  membership  is higher  among  landed
households  than among  land-poor households.  It was  13  percent  among  landless households  in
contrast to  19 percent among households who hold land up to more than 100 decimals.
The paper's  assessment of the impact  of program participation  relies on panel data so the
sample is restricted  to households  who  form the panel,  i.e.,  those who were  interviewed  in both
periods.  That leaves us with 1,638 households  from the 1991/92 survey. But as mentioned earlier,
237 original households split to form 546 households in 1998/99, resulting in 1,947 households. In
order to have a one-to-one  correspondence  among matching households,  we  logically  combined
these split households (including the original household)  and treated them as a single household in
the re-survey  data.  Having  done  this  logical  integration,  we  arrived  at  2,290  households  in  the
1998/99  survey, of which  1,638  are panel households.  Expectedly,  we conducted statistical  tests
to identify if this merger was appropriate.  The tests suggest that the merging does not produce any
statistically different results than in the case of keeping them separate.7
A detail summary statistics of all remaining explanatory  variables is given in the Appendix
Table  A.  And  Table  3 shows  only  the  descriptive  statistics  of household-  and  individual-level
outcomes  that are of particular interest  and  the levels of male and female borrowing.  They are
6  Landholding is considered a proxy of household wealth and poverty in rural Bangladesh.
7See Khandker and Pitt (2002) for the details of the test.contrasted  among  participants  and non-participants  (both target  and  non-target  households)  and
between  1991/92  and  1998/99.  The  monetary  values  of  outcomes  such  as  borrowing  and
consumption  are  adjusted  by  the  consumer  price  index  with  1991/92  as  the  baseline.  While
average  male  borrowing of participant  households  declined  from Tk.  2,730  to  Tk. 2,198  in real
terms,  or by  24 percent  over  the  seven-year  period,  average  female  borrowing  of participants
increased by 126 percent  in real terms.  This also suggests that micro-finance  programs provided
loans mainly through female borrowers,  showing that female  credit on the average accounted  for
85 percent of micro-borrowing  in 1998/99 compared to 66 percent in 1991/92.
Based on the consumption data and the poverty line consumption, we found that aggregate
moderate  poverty has  declined  from  83  percent  in  1991/92 to 66 percent  in  1998/99  (17 percent
points overall  reduction  over seven years).8 The reduction  in the incidence  of moderate  poverty
was 20 percent points  among program  participants  compared  to  15  percent  points  among target
non-participants.  The aggregate  level of extreme poverty was 45 percent in  1991/92  compared to
33 percent in 1998/99 (overall reduction of 12 percent points).  At the same time, extreme poverty
decreased by  19 percent points among program  participants,  13  percent points among target non-
participants  and 5 percent points  among the non-target  group.  The levels  of consumption  (food,
non-food, and overall) had also increased  for program participants over this period,  as well as the
non-land  asset.  The question  is:  how  much  changes  in  consumption  and poverty  were  due  to
borrowing from micro-finance  programs?
V.  Do the poor participate in micro-finance programs?
Before addressing the above question, we would like to address who are the participants of micro-
finance  anyway.  There  is  an  issue  in  the  micro-finance  literature  that  the  very  poor  do  not
participate  in these  programs.  Indeed,  program  participation  is determined  by a host of factors
(both  household  and  village  level)  including  physical  endowments  (such  as  land)  and  human
capital  (such as education),  given the availability  of the program  in a village.  To determine  the
relative  roles of physical  and  human capital endowments  in micro-finance  program participation,
we  estimated  borrowing  equations  given  in  (1) and  (2)  using  cross-section  and  panel  data.
8Moderate poverty is based on an  expenditure that is required  to meet the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization)
guidelines of 2,112 calories of daily dietary requirement of food items and a non-food expenditure that is 30 percent
12Program participation  is represented by the amount of cumulative  amount borrowed  from micro-
finance programs.  This takes the value of zero for non-borrowers.
A  village-level  fixed-effects  method  was  applied  to  equations  (1)  and  (2)  based  on  the
cross-section  data of 1991/92  and  1998/99,  assuming  there  is no  unmeasured  household-level
determinants  of credit.  Such  method  would  help  eliminate  the  influence  of  the  unmeasured
village-level  demand  for  credit  by  men  and  women.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  4.
Econometric  results  with  cross-section  data  confirm  that  households  that  are  resource-poor  in
either  landholding  or  education  participate  more  in  micro-finance  programs.  A  10-percent
increase  in landholding  from an average of 137 decimals during  1991/92 reduces total amount of
borrowing by  1.3  percent for men and 2.8 percent  for women.  This trend  continues  in  1998/99.
Similarly,  a  one-year  increase  in  female  education  reduces  micro-finance  borrowing  by 6  to  7
percent  for women  in both  periods.  In contrast,  an  increase  in  male  education  increases  micro-
finance  borrowing  of men,  particularly  during  1998/99.  However,  since  female  borrowers  are
much more dominant in terms of the number and amount of loan than their male counterpart,  the
impact of female borrowing will be much more pronounced at the aggregate level.
As previously  noted,  those  who  are  poor  in  landholding  and  formal  education  seem  to
participate more  in micro-finance  programs.  An overwhelming  percentage  (about 60 percent) of
micro-finance  program participants in Bangladesh  actually belong to households  holding less than
20  decimals  of  land.  In  addition,  more  than  60  percent  of  the  micro-finance  borrowing
households  are headed by individuals  with no  formal  education  at  all.  Given  this,  the  obvious
question is: do the extreme poor who lack both land and human capital  assets really benefit from
micro-finance programs, where borrowing requires entrepreneurship  and some kind of skills?
If unmeasured  household demand for credit is indeed an important  factor,  the village-level
fixed-effects  method  would  yield biased  estimates  of the  impact  of observed  variables  such  as
education and landholding.  In this case, a household  fixed-effects method is appropriate.  Table 4
also presents the household-level  fixed-effects  estimates of the  same explanatory  variables  using
panel  data.  Although  cross-section  demand  equations  show  the importance  of either physical  or
of food expenditure.  Extreme poverty uses a lower calorie requirement of 1,739 for food items and is usually 80
13human resources,  this is not the case with the household-level  fixed  effects  method.  This means
that unobserved  ability,  such as the entrepreneurship  of a household,  matters most in influencing
the  demand  for  micro-credit  over  time,  although  landholding  and  education,  perhaps  proxy  for
such  unobserved  household  attributes,  may  indicate  the  participation  in  a  program.  In  other
words,  landholding  and  education  are  poor  indicators  of who  participate  and  how  much  they
borrow from a micro-finance  program among males and females from eligible households. Yet in
other words,  even if micro-finance  programs  have been  able to  draw participants  from the poor
with lower  landholding  and  education,  these  factors  do not  matter over  time when  unobserved
ability such as entrepreneurial  ability or other household attributes perhaps matter most in program
participation.
VI.  Estimates of poverty impacts on participants
Poverty reduction is an overarching objective of a targeted program such as targeted micro-finance
programs.  As the poor with unobserved skills or attributes are likely to participate more in micro-
finance programs, the impact assessments of micro-finance  on poverty reduction must take care of
these unobserved factors associated with participation.
The  household  fixed-effects  method,  which  controls  for  fixed  unobserved  attributes  of
households  participating  in  such  programs,  may  not  yet  yield  consistent  estimates  of credit
impacts with  panel data when unmeasured  determinants  (at both household  and village  level)  of
credit vary  over time.  Also  there  is another problem  to worry  about:  If credit  is measured  with
errors (which is likely), this error gets amplified when differencing over time, especially with only
two  time  periods.  This  measurement  error  will impart  "attenuation  bias"  on the  credit  impact
coefficients, meaning that the impact estimates are biased toward zero.  A standard  correction for
such bias is  the use of instrumental  variable (IV)  estimation.  The IV method  is also relevant  to
taking care of the problem that arises when the unobserved characteristics  are not fixed but time-
varying.
Since  it is  the accumulated  credit  or stock of credit that influences  consumption,  we can
rewrite the outcome equation (suppressing subscripts for male and female) as,
percent below the moderate poverty line.
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where we replaced  the credit variable B with stock of credit S. Now for two periods we write the
above consumption equation as,
Cutl  =  XYIlc  +  SUIj5b + Icio  +  e  l
Ci2  =XiflC  +  SO-26b  +  ,cj2  +  e *2
Taking the difference we obtain,
ACy  =  AX,flC  + AS#5b  + AeC?7  +  AE'
Since the difference between the stocks of credit in two periods is in fact the credit reported during
second period, that is B2, we can write the above equation as,
AC,  = AXj,Ic  + B#26b  + A,?ci +  ASCU  (6)
Now  for  the  implementation  of IV method,  let  us  write the  first-stage  equation  for  the
stock of credit (suppressing subscripts for male, female, household and village) as,
St  =X 1 8b +  Ztyt + ebt
where Z is a set of household and village characteristics  distinct from Xs so that they affect S but
not other household  outcomes  dependent on S. The impact of Z variables  on S is allowed to vary
with  time  because  of the  possibility  of differential  effects  of instruments  over  time  on  credit
demand. For two periods we can write the above equation as,
Si  =XI/b +  ZIYI +  ebl
S 2 = X2fib  +  Z2Y2  + e 2
Taking the difference we obtain,
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which becomes,
B2 = AXfb + Zzy2 -Z 1y,  +  eb  (7)
Selecting appropriate Z variables is a crucial part of this exercise.  In order to do  that we define  a
household-level  choice  variable  which  determines  whether or  not  a  household  has  a  choice  to
participate  in a program.  A household's choice  in program participation  depends  on two  factors:
whether  a credit program  operates  in the  village where  the household  lives  in  and whether  the
household itself qualifies to participate  in the program,  based on the landholding criteria (that is if
the household's  landholding  is  0.5  acre or less).  A male's  or female's  choice to participate  in a
program  depends  not  only  on  whether  the  village  has  a  program  and  whether  the  household
satisfies the land eligibility condition but also whether the village has a male or female group,  as
participation is gender-based.  The choice  variable so defined is considered  for both  1991/92 and
1998/99  to  take  care  of the  differential  impacts  of two  periods  and  is  then  interacted  with
household-level  exogenous variables and village fixed-effects  to get the instruments.
Table  5 shows  a  distribution  of survey  villages  by  male  and  female  choice  group.  A
common trend is obvious from this table that groups with both males and females  have increased
in  the program  areas  over  the years.  Another  interesting  phenomenon  is  expansion  of program
outreach in areas that were previously non-program.  Although number of villages have increased
from  1991/92  to 1998/99,  number of non-program villages  with no program has decreased  from
15 to 5.
Table  6  presents  household  fixed-effects  IV  estimates  of  program  impacts  on  six
outcomes:  per  capita  total  expenditure,  per  capita  food  expenditure,  per  capita  non-food
expenditure,  the incidence of moderate  and extreme poverty,  and household  non-land asset.  The
results  are  quite  interesting.  Male  borrowing  has  no  impact  on  household  per  capita  total
expenditure and moderate poverty, but some impact on per capita non-food  expenditure.  For the
expenditure  and  non-land  asset  equations,  we  used  logarithmic  equation,  in  which  case  the
coefficients of credit measure  the response elasticity.  In contrast, the poverty incidence  equations
16are log-linear equation, in which case the coefficient on credit measures the probabilistic change in
outcomes with respect to percentage  changes  in borrowing.  Thus,  a 10-percent  increase  in male
borrowing increases household non-food expenditure by 0.2 percent.
In contrast,  a 10-percent  increase in female borrowing increases household per capita total
expenditure  by 0.2 percent,  food expenditure by 0.1  percent, non-food expenditure by 0.5  percent
and household non-land asset by 0.2 percent.
Unlike  consumption  and  asset  variables  which  are  continuous,  the  poverty  incidence
variables  are binomial  (meaning  1 if the household  is moderately  or  extremely  poor  and  zero
otherwise).  Household fixed-effects  method is non-applicable  with such discontinuous  variables.
Two-stage method is even harder.  Thus, we used linear probability functional  form to estimate the
impact  of borrowing  in  a  two-stage  fashion  just  to  indicate  the  direction  of change  in  these
outcomes  due to borrowing.  The results  support the view  that micro-finance  borrowing reduces
poverty, especially extreme poverty.
In  order  to  quantify  the  contribution  of  micro-finance  to  poverty  reduction,  we  can
alternatively  use the consumption  estimates.9 The results of this exercise  are shown in  the first
two columns  of Table  9.  The findings  indicate  that participants'  moderate  poverty dropped  8.5
percentage points over the period of seven years, while extreme poverty dropped about  18.2 points
over the  same  period.  Interestingly  enough,  the returns  to  borrowing  have declined  over time.
Based on the panel data estimates, the returns to female borrowing are  10.5 percent, which was 18
percent  according  to  cross-sectional  estimates  of 1991/92  data.  Overall,  the results  suggest  the
following:  (1)  micro-finance  impacts  are  much  stronger  for  female  borrowers  than  for  male
borrowers  and that returns  to borrowing have  declined over time;  (2)  the  impacts  on expenditure
are  more  pronounced  for non-food  expenditure  than  for  food  expenditure;  and  (3)  the  poverty
9Since a  household's per capita consumption is  directly linked with its poverty status, the impact of micro-credit
borrowing on per capita consumption can also be used to determine  the total change in  household's poverty status due
to micro-credit borrowing. A  simulation  exercise is  done  where marginal impact of micro-credit borrowing (in  this
case only female borrowing  as male borrowing has no significant impact) on household per capita expenditure is
calculated from the regression output shown in  table 6.  That marginal  imnpact is  used to calculate  the increase in
participant household's total consumption due to micro-credit borrowing. This amount when subiracted from the
current consumption of participants,  gives a  pre-borrowing  level of consumption  and this consumption can be
compared with the poverty line to get a  pre-borrowing poverty status of the participants.
17impacts of female borrowing  are much stronger in reducing extreme poverty than it is in reducing
moderate poverty at the participant  level.
VlIII.  Estimates of spillover and aggregate  impacts
The  total  loan  outstanding  of micro-finance  organizations  in  Bangladesh  was  about  US$600
million  in  1998/99.  This  indicates  a  large  inflow  of micro-funds  in  the  rural  areas,  which  is
expected  to  make  an  aggregate  impact  on the  local  economy.  We  have just seen  that micro-
finance  has  sizeable  effects  on  the  welfare  of  borrowing  households  in  terms  of  raising
consumption  and  non-land  asset as  well  as  in reducing  moderate  and  extreme  poverty.  But are
these  effects  felt  beyond  the  program  participants?  How  do  we  account  for  estimating micro-
finance effects on non-participants?
The  cross-section  data  estimates  of Pitt  and  Khandker  (1998)  show  the  effects  of
participation above and beyond the non-participation  in a program.  A program may affect the non-
participants  and,  thus spillover  effects  are non-zero.  Only longitudinal data allow us to estimate
the  spillover effects.  We therefore  need  panel  data  to  do  so. When  there  are  spillover  effects,
unobserved village heterogeneity  would be correlated  with program placement, but the causation
would  go  from  program  placement  to  village  unobserved  effects,  not  from  village  effects  to
program  placement.  This measurement  problem  implies that  the placement  of a credit  program
may cause a village effect in addition to a pre-existing (time-invariant)  village effect.
Cy =8Xy +.Sy +  7i  +Iy + Qj + gv  (8)
where  Qj represents  the  external effects  of a program in a village  and has the value of zero if no
program is located in the village, pj is unobserved village-level  fixed-effect,  and  qv, is unobserved
household-level  fixed-effect.  The program  effect  parameter,  6, estimated  with cross-section data
captures  all program effects only if  Qj = 0. (None of the village-specific  heterogeneity  is caused
by programs).  If village  externalities  exist  (4j  *  0),  then  the  spillover  effect  is not separately
identified from the time-invariant village effect (uj).  With panel data, it is possible to estimate the
spillover effect with the following equation:
18Co, =/JXY,++3S±j+  ,7i  + n,,+  .6u,  (9)
We  excluded  the p-term,  since  with panel  data,  household  fixed-effects  sweep  away the  village
effects  and  make  it  possible  to  estimate  the  impact  of n,,.  Suppose  .(,  is  measured  by  the
aggregate  credit  obtained  in  a  village,  then  the  spillover  effect  is  measured  by  the  change  in
behavior of non-participants  due  to change in aggregate micro-credit  obtained in the village.  That
is, for non-participants,
CkJ =f3X  J  +  >  XS  +  7  +skj  t  t  = 1,2, &  St  = 0  (10)
i1=
where k refers to the non-participants  of micro-finance programs living inj-th village.
Since measurement  errors are  diminished with aggregation,  there is no need to use a two-
stage  method  for taking  care  of attenuation  bias  with  credit  variables.  The  above  equation  is
estimated by the household fixed-effects method that eliminates also program placement bias.  The
estimated effects of credit on non-participants  are presented in Table 7.
The benefits  of non-participants  depend  on  the amount of credit obtained  by all program
borrowers  living in a village.  We find an evidence of externality of micro-credit programs.  Male
borrowing  from  micro-finance  programs  affects  the  food,  non-food,  and  total  per  capita
expenditure  of non-participants  but has  no effect  on the  non-land  asset.  In  contrast,  although
female borrowing has no significant effect on consumption of non-participants, it has a substantial
effect on their non-land asset.  For instance, a 10-percent increase in aggregate village micro-credit
borrowing by female members  increases household  non-land asset of non-participants  by as much
as  1.1  percent.  Micro-finance  also  affects  the  poverty  incidence  among  non-participants.  The
negative  spillover effect on poverty is,  however,  more  pronounced  for extreme  poverty  than  for
moderate poverty.  The two-stage  logit estimates  indicate that  the probability  of reducing extreme
poverty can be as much as 0.09 percentage points. Based on alternative consumption estimates, the
net  contribution  of  female  borrowing  on  poverty  is  calculated  and  presented  in  table  9.
Accordingly, moderate poverty for non-participants  declined by 1.1  percentage points and extreme
19poverty  by  4.8  points  over the  study period  because  of female  borrowing  in  the  village  from
micro-finance programs.
We  may  also  assess  the  aggregate  effect  of micro-finance  by  examining  the  program
effects  for an average household by estimating similar equation. For all households we can write:
C  =  IX ,,,  + 8  S,,,  + vl,  +  E,IJ  t = 1,2,  & S'j  = 0  (11)
where  I  = i+k.  Unlike  the  earlier  equation,  every  household  in the  village  in  this equation  is
affected by the same male and female credit irrespective of participation  status in a micro-finance
program.  A simple  household-level  fixed-effects  method  is  used  to  estimate  the  micro-finance
aggregate effects on welfare of all households living in a village.
Table 8 presents the aggregate micro-finance  impact for male  and female borrowings.  The
results  strongly support the view that micro-credit not only affects the welfare of participants  and
non-participants but also the aggregate welfare at village level.  Male borrowing increases average
household  welfare  by  increasing  household  total  consumption,  as  well  as  food  and  nonfood
consumption,  and by reducing  extreme poverty, with only a minimal effect on moderate poverty.
Female credit, on the other hand, reduces extreme poverty and increases household non-land asset
for an average household in a village.
Micro-finance  operation  in a village,  therefore,  reduces  the incidence  of extreme poverty
for  an  average  household  living  in  a  village  but  it does  not  affect  the  incidence  of moderate
poverty.  The probability of reducing aggregate  extreme poverty is approximately  .03 percentage
points  for  female  borrowing  and  .08  percentage  points  for  male borrowing.  However,  the net
contribution  of  female  borrowing  over  the  study  period  (based  on  alternative  consumption
estimates  and  presented  in  table  9)  is  1.7  percentage  points  for  moderate  poverty  and  5.5
percentage points.  Non-borrowers seem to benefit from micro-finance partly due to the externality
of borrowing by program participants  and partly because of externality  due to program  placement.
Therefore, micro-finance  contributes to the overall welfare of the society.
20VIII.  Summary and conclusions
Program  evaluation compares outcomes of treatment groups with those of control groups.  Finding
control group in a non-experimental  setting is very difficult. Traditionally,  resorting to instruments
for  identifying  program  effects  is  done  with  cross-section  data.  However,  finding  good
instruments is equally difficult.  Pitt and Khandker (1998) used quasi-experimental  method relying
on  exogenous  eligibility  conditions  as  a  way  of  identifying  program  effects.  Some  of  the
conditions  are  restrictive  and  might  not  be  reliable,  for  example,  the  non-enforceability  of
landholding  criterion  for program  participation.  Results  may be  sensitive  to  methods  used  in
impact  assessment.  An impact  assessment  was  carried  out using a  follow-up  survey to see  the
sensitivity of the findings (see Khandker and Pitt (2002) for details).
This  paper  carried  out  a similar  exercise  by  estimating  the effects  of micro-finance  on
consumption,  poverty  and  non-land  assets  for  participants,  non-participants,  and  an  average
villager, assuming that micro-finance programs have spillover (externality)  effects.  The results are
resounding:  micro-finance  matters  a  lot  for  the  very  poor  borrowers  and  also  for  the  local
economy.  In  particular,  micro-finance  programs  matter  a lot  to  the  poor in  raising  per  capita
consumption,  mainly  on  non-food,  as  well  as  household  non-land  asset.  This  increases  the
probability  that  the program  participants  may be  able  to  lift  themselves  out  of poverty.  The
welfare  impact  of micro-finance  is also  positive  for all households,  including  non-participants,
indicating  that  micro-finance  programs  are helping  the  poor beyond  income redistribution  with
contribution  to local income growth.  Programs have  spillover  effects in local economies,  thereby
increasing  local  village welfare.  In particular,  we  find  that micro-finance  helps  reduce  extreme
poverty  more  than  moderate  poverty  at  the  village  level.  Yet the  aggregate  poverty  reduction
effects  are  not  quite  substantial  to have  a large  dent  on national  level  aggregate  poverty.  This
concern brings to the fore the effectiveness of micro-finance  as an instrument to solve the problem
of poverty in Bangladesh.
To  exhibit  a  stronger  impact  on  poverty  reduction,  micro-finance  should  perhaps  go
beyond  the provision  of financial  services.  It should  find ways  to improve  the  skills of its poor
borrowers  to  improve  their  productivity  and  income.  It  should  also  assist  its  borrowers  in
21marketing  and improving the quality of their products. Micro-finance  is, however, only one of the
many instruments  of poverty reduction.  Growth matters too-even more significantly than other
instruments.  Investment  in human  capital and other means to empower the poor also matter.  To
achieve substantial poverty reduction, the other avenues must be explored as well.
22Table 1: Distribution of households by program participation
Program participation status  1991192 survey  1998199 survey
Grameen Bank members  8.5  14.3
BRAC  members  11.6  9.3
BRDB  RD-12 members  6.2  3.6
Other NGO members  0  11.1
Multiple program  members  0  7.4
Target non-participants  40.3  25.6
Non-target households  33.4  28.8
No. of observations  1,769  2,599
Note: Other NGO households include members of ASA, PROSHIKA,  GSS,  Youth Development and other small NGOs.
Table 2: Household participation  in micro-credit programs
199119  survey  1998199 surveq_
Landholding  Participation rate  Distribution of  Participation rate in  Distribution of  Participation rate In  multple
(decimal)  In  each  partidcpants by  each landholding  participants by  programs In  each
landholding group  landholding group  group  landholding group  landholding group
0  56.4  8.3  58.8  10.9  12.5
1-20  33.1  53.8  58.0  49.8  15.8
21-50  29.5  15.3  48.3  14.5  13.3
51-100  24.3  9.4  43.7  11.3  20.3
101-250  16.0  10.3  35.0  10.6  18.1
251+  7.1  2.9  12.0  2.9  21.8
All households  26.0  100.0  45.6  100.0  16.1
Observations  1,769  894  2,599  1,630  1,630
23Table 3: Summary statistics of outcome and credit variables
Variables  1991192  1998199
Program  Target non-  Non-target  All  Program  Target non-  Non-target  All
paricipants  participants  rou  households  participants  participants  group  households
Male borrowing  (taka)  2,730.0  0  0  705.7  2,198.3  0  0  1,173.3
(6,341.1)  (3437.5)  (8,112.7)  (6,007.9)
Female  borrowing  (taka)  5,311.6  0  0  1,373.0  12,008.7  0  0  6,367.4
(7,573.4)  (4,497.5)  (18,371.9)  (14,658.1)
Household per capita yearly total  3,923.4  3,838.0  5,586.0  4,462.7  5,276.9  4,782.0  7,587.6  5,810.1
expenditure (taka)  (1,566.6)  (1,795.5)  (3,442.8)  (2,578.7)  (3,490.4)  (2,977.9)  (6,317.4)  (4,502.5)
Household per capita yearly  food (taka)  3,057.4  3,018.7  3,629.2  3,239.2  3,526.9  3,466.0  4,400.8  3,753.4
(786.3)  (948.7)  (1,050.6)  (987.9)  (1,304.2)  (1,634.9)  (2,156.3)  (1,687.8)
Household per capita yearly nonfood  (taka)  866.0  819.3  1,956.8  1,223.5  1,750.0  1,316.0  3,186.8  2,056.7
(1,098.8)  (1,118.6)  (2,875.2)  (1,982.8)  (2,770.7)  (1,753.9)  (5,287.0)  (3,575.1)
Head count ratio for  moderate poverty  0.903  0.896  0.702  0.831  0.705  0.747  0.503  0.658
(0.296)  (0.306)  (0.458)  (0.375)  (0.456)  (0.435)  (0.501)  (0.474)
Head count ratio for extreme  poverty  0.526  0.581  0.245  0.451  0.343  0.454  0200  0.326
___________________________________  (0.500)  (0.494)  (0.431)  1  (0.498)  (0.475)  (0.499)  (0.401)  (0.469)
Household non-land asset (taka)  17,891.9  14,251.3  53,914.7  28,867.4  31,941.4  29,044.5  72,199.2  42,358.1
1  (25,606.1)  (27,122.4)  (85,190.3)  (57,331.1)  (100,778.0)  (69,022.2)  (109,925.1)  (99,700.5)
Observations  824  567  247  1,638  1,122  279  237  1,638
Note: Figures in  parentheses are standard deviations.
Table 4: Fixed-effects Tobit estimates of micro-credit borrowing
Village-level fixed effects  Household-level fixed effects
Explanatory variables  1991192 data  1998199 data  Panel data
Log of male  Log of female  Log of male  Log of female  Log of male  Log of female
borrowing  borrowing  borrowing  borrowing  borrowing  borrowing
Maximum educaton of  0.03  -0.003  0.03  0.003  0.05  -0.04
household male  (years)  (0.70)  (-0.05)  (1.72)  (0.08)  (.51)  (-  1.0 1)
Maximum education of  -0.04  -0.07  -0.02  -0.06  -0.01  0.01
household female (years)  (-1.10)  (-1.63)  (-0.43)  (-1.74)  (-0.43)  (0.36)
Log of household land assets  -0.13  -0.28  -0.09  -0.55  -0.01  -0.15
(decimal)  (-2.55)  (4.56)  (-2.21)  (-8.38)  (-0.13)  -1.22)
F-statistcs  3.14  7.05  3.42  13.40  5.51  11.98
Number of observatons  1,769  1,769  2,290  2,290  3,276  3,276
Notes: 1.  Figures in  parentheses are t-staUistics.
2.  Complete regressions include, in  addition to variables given, sex and age of household head, if  parents; brothers and sisters of household head;
household head's spouse own  land.
24Table 5: Distribution of villages by credit program  and group type
Group type  Village  type
1991192  1  -_'  1998/99
BRAC  BRDB  GB  None  Total  BRAC  BRDB  GB  None  Total
Female only  7  3  12  0  22  10  1  12  14  37
Male Only  0  9  1  0  10  0  0  1  0  1
Female and male  17  12  11  0  40  17  23  14  7  61
No program  0  0  0  15  15  0  0  0  5  5
Total  24  24  24  15  15  27  24  27  26  104
Note: In  1991/92 non-program  villages were  those villages which did not have any credit programs.  But in  1998/99 none-program villages indude old non-program villages and
newly induded villages that are outside old BRAC,  BRDB and GB thana. Many of these villages now have programs
Table 6: Two-stage fixed-effects linear estimates of micro-finance on household welfare of participants
Log of household  Log of household per  Log of household per  If  household is  Hf  household is  Log of
Explanatory  per capia  yearly  capita yearly food  capita  yearly non-food  below  moderate  below  extreme  household non-
variables  total expenditure  expenditure (taka)  expenditure (taka)  poverty line  poverty line  land asset (taka)
(taka)
Log of male borrowing  0.01  -0.001  0.02  -0.01  -0.003  -0.021
(1.08)  (-0.15)  (1.68)  (-1.04)  (-0.38)  (-1.00)
Log of female  0.02  0.01  0.05  -0.01  -0.02  0.02
borrowing  (3.60)  (2.14)  (4.95)  (-2.68)  (-3.78)  (2.36)
Adjusted  Rsquared  0.07  0.08  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.11
Observations  1,638  1,638  1,638  1,638  1,638  1,638
Notes: 1.  Figures in  parentheses are t-stalistics.
2.  Compete regressions indude, in  addition to above variables, household level variables  mentioned in  Table 2  plus village&evel  price and infrastructure variables.
3 All variables reported here are in  logarithmic form except for poverty variables, which are dummy variables defining whether a  household is  below poverty line
Source: BIDS-World  Bank household surveys,  1991/92 and 1998199
25Table 7: Fixed-effects estimates of a  gregate village c  dit on household welfare of nonparticipant households
Log of household  Log of household  Log of household  If  household is  If household is  Log of
Explanatory  per capib  yearly  per capita yearly  per capita  yearly  below  moderate  below  extreme  household non-
variables  total expenditure  food expenditure  non-food  poverty line  poverty line  land asset (taka)
(taka)  (taka)  expenditure (taka)  (conditional logit)  (conditional
logit)
Log of male borrowing  0.048  0.032  0.093  -0.419  -0.484  0.022
(2.142)  (1.772)  (2.152)  (-1.248)  (-2.033)  (0.401)
Log of female  -0.006  0.001  -0.031  0.045  -0.247  0.105
borrowing  (4391)  (0.081)  (-1.041)  (0.253)  (-1.918)  (2.797)
F/Chi 2statistics  F(18,479) =  5.61  F(18,479) =  2.87  F(18,479) =  5.70  Chi 2(18)  =71.71  Chi2(18) =  36.09  F(18,479)=11.73
Observations  994  994  994  994  994  994
Notes: 1.  Figures in  parentheses are t-statistics.
2.  Complete regressions  include, in  addition to above vanables, household-level  varables mentioned in  Table 2.
3.  All variables reported here are in  logarithmic form except for poverty variables, which  are dummy variables defining whether a  household is  below poverty line.
Source: BIDS-World  Bank household surveys,  1991192 and  1998/99
Table 8: Fixed-effects estimates of aggregate village credit on household welfare of all households
Log of household  Log of household  Log of household  If household is  If household is  Log of household
Explanatory  per capita  yearly  per capib yearly  per  apita  yearly  below  moderate  below  extreme  non-land asset
variables  total expenditure  food expenditure  non-food  poverty line  poverty line  (taka)
(taka)  (taka)  expenditure (taka)  (conditional  (conditional logit)
logit)
Log of male  0.045  0.029  0.110  -0.245  -0.412  0.019
borrowing  (3.688)  (3.058)  (4.448)  (-1.485)  (-3.488)  (0.662)
Log of female  -0.003  -0.002  0.0003  -0.094  -0.144  0.118
borrowing  (-0.301)  (-0.310)  (0.021)  (-0.871)  (-2.026)  (5.672)
FIChi2 statistics  F(18,1620) =  19.27  F(18,1620) =  11.63  F(18,1620) =  22.70  Chi2 (18)  =  Chi2 (18) =  169.80  F(18,1620)=32.66
245.50
Observations  3,276  3,276  3,276  3,276  3,276  3,276
Notes: 1.  Figures in  parentheses are t-statistics.
2.  Complete  regressions indude, in  addition to above variables, household-evel  variables mentioned in  Table 2.
3.  All variables reported here are in  loganthmic form  except for poverty variables, which are dummy variables defining whether a  household is  below poverty line.
Source: BIDS-Wordd  Bank household surveys, 1991/92  and 1998/99
26Table 9: Simulated impact of micro-credit borrowing  on poverty
Poverty indicators  Partici pants  Non-pa  rticipants  All households
Before  After  Before  After  Before  After
borrowing  borrowing  village-level  village-  village,  village-
aggregate  level  level  level
borrowing  aggregate  aggregate  aggregate
borrowing  borrowing  borrowing
Head count ratio for moderate poverty  85.5  77.0  73.9  72.8  76.2  74.5
Head count ratio for extreme poverty  58.5  40.3  42.7  37.9  44.3  38 .8
Observations  1,946  1,330  3,276
Source.  BIDS-Wodd Bank household surveys,  1991/92 and 1998/99
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Table A: Summary statistics of explanatory variables
Variables  1991/92  1998/99  Whole sample
Cumulative male borrowing ( taka)  705.68  1,173.27  939.48
_  _(3,437.55)  (6,007.89)  (4,899.30)
Cumulative  female borrowing ( taka)  1,372.98  6,367.38  3,870.18
__  (4,497.54)  (14,658.06)  (11,124.09)
Program duration of males (years)  0.39  0.80  0.59
(1.38)  (2.51)  (2.04)
Program duration of females (years)  0.67  2.22  1.45
(1.61)  (3.51)  (2.84)
Village aggregate male borrowing (taka)  30,678  49,051  39,628
(48,701)  (111,060)  (86,470)
Village aggregate female borrowing  47,983  222,971  136,584
(62,978)  (316,508)  (244,141)
Highest grade completed by household head (years)  2.77  2.49  2.63
(3.68)  (3.64)  (3.66)
Sex of household head (male= l,  fernale=0)  0.95  0.87  0.91
(0.21)  (0.34)  (0.28)
Age of household head (years)  41.29  48.50  44.89
(12.94)  (13.18)  (13.55)
Maximum education by household male (years)  3.44  4.57  4.00
(3.93)  (4.53)  (4.28)
Maximum education by household male (years)  1.79  3.02  2.40
(3.04)  (3.83)  (3.51)
No adult male lives in household  0.03  0.03  0.03
(0.17)  (0.16)  (0.17)
No adult male lives in household  0.01  0.01  0.01
(0. 11)  (0.08)  (0. 10)
Household land (decimals)  130.03  133.05  131.54
(316.56)  (325.85)  (321.19)
No spouse lives in household  0.11  0.17  0.14
(0.31)  (0.37)  (0.34)
Parents of household head own land  0.21  0.17  0.19
(0.41)  (0.37)  (0.39)
Brothers of household head own land  0.39  0.37  0.38
(0.49)  (0.48)  (0.49)
Sisters of household head own land  0.40  0.31  0.35
(0.49)  (0.46)  (0.48)
Parents of household head's spouse own land  0.35  0.32  0.34
(0.48)  (0.47)  (0.47)
Brothers of  household  head's spouse own land  0.39  0.38  0.39
(0.49)  (0.49)  (0.49)
Sisters of household head's spouse own land  0.40  0.31  0.35
(0.49)  (0.46)  (0.48)
If village is accessed by road all year  0.94  0.85  0.90
(0.23)  (0.36)  (0.31)
Proportion of village land irrigated  0.44  0.57  0.51
(0.31)  (0.32)  (0.32)
If village has electricity  0.50  0.60  0.55
(0.50)  (0.49)  (0.50)
Village price of rice  9.71  10.38  10.04
(0.97)  (1.68)  (1.41)
30Table A: Summary statistics of explanatory  variables (continued)
Variables  1991/92  1998/99  Whole  sample
Village price of wheat flour  8.64  7.42  8.03
(1.37)  (0.85)  (1.29)
Village price of mustard oil  54.22  39.45  46.83
(4.45)  (4.04)  (8.52)
Village price of egg  2.34  1.89  2.11
(0.35)  (0.33)  (0.41)
Village price of milk  12.15  10.61  11.38
(3.20)  (3.10)  (3.24)
Village price of potato  8.63  7.03  7.83
(0.93)  (1.14)  (1.31)
Village male daily wage  35.35  44.56  39.95
(8.15)  (11.43)  (10.94)
Village female daily wage  19.59  25.71  22.65
(9.09)  (8.81)  (9.46)
No female wage in village  0.10  0  0.05
(0.30)  (0)  (0.22)
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
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